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Yamagishi, 1994). Others have chosen not to define trust
(e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Ouchi, 1981). Why the confusion?
One reason is that each discipline views trust from its
own unique perspective. Like the story of the six blind men
and the elephant, a disciplinary lens causes psychologists to
see trust as a personal trait, sociologists to see trust as a
social structure, and economists to see trust as an economic
choice mechanism (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995).
However, the other reason is that trust is itself a vague
term. In ordinary English usage, trust has acquired a large
number of meanings. That is, depending on the context, we
may think of many different things when someone uses the
word ‘trust.’ An analysis of the word trust in three
unabridged dictionaries (Websters, Random House, and
Oxford) showed that trust had far more definitions (9, 24,
and 18, respectively) than did the terms cooperation (3, 2,
6), confidence (6, 8, 13), and predictable (1,2, 1).
Cooperation, confidence, and predictable are the terms
which Mayer, et al. (1995) used to discriminate trust from
similar concepts. On average, trust had 17.0 definitions,
while the others had an average of 4.7. Hence, trust is
naturally hard to narrow down to one specific definition.
Few have addressed this issue head-on by trying to
reconcile the various types of trust into a sensible set of
constructs (exceptions: Barber, 1983; Bromiley &
Cummings, 1995; Dobing, 1993; Kee & Knox, 1970;
Mayer, et al., 1995; Mishra, 1996). In part, this is because
of disciplinary perspective. For example, sociologists Lewis
& Weigert (1985b) argued that psychological views of trust
are invalid because trust cannot be reduced to a personal
characteristic. Thus, social structural definitions (e.g.,
Shapiro, 1987) are almost impossible to reconcile against
personal expectancy definitions (e.g., Rotter, 1971).
The other problem has been that empirical research has
driven most definitions of trust, and one need only define
one type of trust to do empirical research. Therefore, each
researcher has developed a narrow conceptualization of
trust that fits the type of research they do. They defend their
narrow trust conceptualization by referring to the factor
analysis. Van de Ven (1989: 487) warned that when theories
on a topic widely diverge, the advocates "for each theory
engage in activities to make their theory better by increasing

Abstract
Trust is a vital relationship concept that needs further
conceptual analysis, not just empirical testing. Trust has been
defined in so many ways by so many different researchers
across disciplines that a typology of the various types of
trust is sorely needed. This paper justifies and develops
such an interdisciplinary typology and defines the
constructs within the typology. These constructs, though
defined at the personal level, are scalable to various levels
of analysis and may be used in various trust situations,
including IS/customer relations.
Trust is central to interpersonal (Golembiewski &
McConkie, 1975) and commercial (Morgan & Hunt, 1994)
relationships. Trust is crucial wherever risk, uncertainty, or
interdependence exist (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995;
Mishra, 1996). These conditions flourish in many settings,
and certainly exist in the relationship between Information
Systems (IS) people and their customers. Trust has been
found to be important to IS/customer performance (Nelson &
Cooprider, 1996), and is also key in virtual teams (Jarvenpaa
& Leidner, 1998) and e-commerce (Ba, Whinston & Zhang,
1999; Hoffman, et al., 1999; Jarvenpaa, Tranctinsky & Vitale,
1998; Noteberg, Christaanse & Wallage, 1999; Stewart,
1999). As conditions become more uncertain because of
downsizing, mergers, and more complex business dealings,
the need for trust grows (Mishra, 1996).

The State of Trust Definitions
A good deal of trust research has recently been initiated,
with the potential to produce significant understanding of
various IS phenomena. However, an understanding of what
the term ‘trust’ means is needed in order to interpret and
compare trust results. In this paper, we justify and specify a
conceptual typology of trust constructs. Then we define the
four resulting constructs and ten measurable subconstructs.
Distrust constructs are not the same as trust constructs
(Lewicki, et al., 1998), and lie outside our present scope.
Several researchers have reported that trust definitions
are numerous and confusing (e.g., Lewis & Weigert, 1985a;
Shapiro, 1987; Taylor, 1989). Some have said that trust is
an elusive concept to define (Gambetta, 1988; Yamagishi &
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scientists have argued that effective conceptualization is vital
to progress in validating any construct (Kaplan, 1964;
Schwab, 1980). Thus, building a good theoretical, conceptual
view of trust is a key to moving trust research forward.
Because trust is so broad a concept, and because so many
definitions have proliferated, a typology of trust constructs
seems appropriate. A good typology of trust concepts would
do two things (Tiryakian, 1968). First, it would create order
out of chaos by distinguishing clearly among concepts that at
first appear to be the same concept (trust). Second, it would
permit one to postulate how the different types of trust relate
to each other (Schwab, 1980), creating a model of trust types.
“This is because a good typology is not a collection of
undifferentiated entities but is composed of a cluster of traits
which do in reality ‘hang together.’” (Tiryakian, 1968: 178)
To produce an acceptable typology requires analysis of
existing trust definitions. We compared various definitions, as
in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), to find
conceptual trends. Among about eighty articles and books on
trust, we identified sixty-five that provided definitions of
trust. These articles and books were from psychology/social
psychology (23), sociology/economics/ political science (19),
and management/communications (23). Each was either oftcited by others or had a unique trust definition.
By analyzing these definitions, we found two broad
groupings of definitions. First, many definitions could be
categorized into different conceptual types, such as attitudes,
beliefs, behaviors, and dispositions. Second, many definitions
could be categorized as reflecting different referents: trust in
something, trust in someone, or trust in a specific
characteristic of someone (e.g., one’s honesty). In terms of
specific characteristics, sixteen categories of trust-related
characteristics were identified (Table 1).
As Table 1 shows, the sixteen categories may be distilled
into five second order conceptual categories by comparing
one type of characteristic with another. Most of these
categorizations are intuitive; however, based on the literature,
we decided to distinguish between Predictability and Integrity
by defining the latter as value-laden and the former as valueless. Thus, the value-laden definitions of dependable and
reliable we found in the literature would more closely fit in
the Integrity category than in the Predictability category. Four
second order categories (competence, benevolence, integrity,
and predictability) cover 91.8% of the characteristic-based
trust definitions found in the 65 sources.
The two types of groupings of trust definitions (construct
type and referent) seemed relatively exclusive, in that the first
refers to what type of construct trust is, while the second
refers to the object of trust. Therefore, we used these two
categories as an N X N table that enabled us to depict the
types of trust definitions researchers have used. Table 2
shows the result of using these two groupings as table
dimensions. We mapped each of the definitions in the sixtyfive articles and books onto these dimensions. The result was

its internal consistency, often at the expense of limiting its
scope...[S]uch impeccable micro logic is creating macro
nonsense!" This seems to be happening in trust research. A
more beneficial way would be to recognize the various types
of trust that exist and to specify which type of trust is being
addressed in the current work. In this paper, we will use the
term “trust” to refer to the broad, generic trust concept.

The Need for Consistent Trust Definitions
Researchers should agree on what trust types exist for two
reasons. First, common definitions would enable researchers
to sort out findings across studies. Currently, this is very hard
to do (Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975). Without agreedupon definitions, effective meta-analyses would be difficult
and ineffective. A search in ABI Inform yielded only two
meta-analyses about trust, both published very recently. This
meager result may be a symptom of the difficulty of
comparing trust studies. What trust research needs is a set of
rules to translate one result to another, as Rubin (1988)
recommended for the love literature. Consensus knowledge
about trust will progress at a more rapid rate when study
results can be compared.
Second, consistent definitions provide a means for
researchers to communicate clearly with practitioners and
provide them better prescriptions. This dialogue would both
enable trust research to be more valuable to practitioners and
provide researchers the value of intuitive practitioner
knowledge. Researchers like social psychologist Harold
Kelley (1992) have commented that the interplay between
common-sense psychology and scientific psychology is useful
to both parties.
Also, it is troublesome that trust prescriptions to
practitioners are typically couched in the same vague term
(‘trust’) that has confused so many researchers. Vague
prescriptions about generic trust are dangerous because they
may not address the specific problem in a productive way.
Worse, the researcher/consultant’s narrow type of trust may
be prescribed mistakenly to situations in which it is not
appropriate. This is like giving a patient a pain medication for
a heart problem because it worked for a headache. As an
example in IS, what better leads to adoption of an information
system, user trusting perceptions about the IS group or user
disposition to trust? Both have been called trust, making it
difficult to sort out what really leads to what.

One Suggestion: Create a Trust Typology
The key to defining trust lies only partially in empirical
work or even in construct validation work. After all, it is the
plethora of empirical trust studies that has brought trust
research to its current state. Wrightsman (1991: 411), who
studied trust empirically for years, said, “…the general
concept of trust deserves much more theoretical analysis.
Measurement has advanced more rapidly than conceptual
clarification…” Several trust researchers agree (Kee & Knox,
1970; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Taylor, 1989). Other
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the expected finding--that trust definitions were almost
(excuse the expression) all over the map.

Table 2 Mapping of Literature Trust Definitions
Type

Table 1 Trust Characteristic-based Definition Categories
Trust-related
Characteristic

Second Order
Conceptual
Category

1. Competent
2. Expert
3. Dynamic

4. Predictable

Count

COMPETENCE

14
3
3
20

PREDICTABILITY

6

5. Good, Moral
6. Good will
7. Benevolent,
Caring
8. Responsive

Referent
Competence

% of
Total

4
38

INTEGRITY

11
1
8
6
26

9. Honest
10. Credible
11. Reliable
12. Dependable

13. Open
14. Careful,
Safe
15. Shared
Understanding
16. Personally
Attractive

Integrity

xxxxx
xxxx

6.1

Predictability
Other

x

Other
Referent

Belief
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxx

Inten
-tion

xxxx

xxx

xxxxx

x

xxxxxx

x

xxxxxxx
xxxxxx

xxxxx

xxxxx
xx

xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx

Behavior

x
xxxxx

xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xx

Notes: 1. Each “x” represents one trust definition. 2. Attitude
includes affect and confidence; Belief includes “expectancy”

38.8

Figure 1 An Interdisciplinary Model of Trust Constructs
Psychology/
Economics

26.5

Disposition
to
Trust

1
8
98

x

20.4

1

Grand Total

Attitude

xxxxx
xxxxx
x

3
3

OTHER

Disposition

Benevolence

6
10
18

BENEVOLENCE

Structural

Sociology

InstitutionBased
Trust

Social Psychology

Trusting
Beliefs

Trusting
Intention

8.2
100.0

A Typology of Related Trust Constructs

The four constructs in Figure 1 may also be further
subdivided into lower level constructs that are measurable via
scales. Disposition to Trust includes the Faith in Humanity
and Trusting Stance subconstructs. Institution-based Trust
consists of Structural Assurance and Situational Normality.
Trusting Beliefs include Competence, Benevolence, Integrity,
and Predictability beliefs. These four types of Trusting
Beliefs correspond to the first four rows of Table 2. Trusting
Intention includes Willingness to Depend (Dobing, 1993) and
Subjective Probability of Depending (Curall & Judge, 1995).
As the definitions below will show, these subdivisions of
the four main constructs are proposed to be conceptually
distinguishable from each other and from the construct itself.
They are not simply two parts of a dual construct. Like the

From this mapping, and from an analysis of how trust
types were related to each other (McKnight, Cummings &
Chervany, 1998), we saw the potential for an interdisciplinary
model of trust types. The model (Figure 1) has constructs
representing four of the columns in Table 2. The Attitude and
Belief columns were combined into Trusting Beliefs, which
are defined to have both affective and cognitive components
(see Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). Trusting Behavior was
dropped because the consequents of Trusting Intention
already have other labels, (e.g., cooperation, information
sharing, entering agreements with, risk taking, or involvement
with). What these have in common is that, in each case, one
depends on the other party.
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research stream (e.g., Riker, 1971). Here’s an example. We
once asked an IS employee if she trusted her newly hired
manager, whom she had never met before. She said that she
did trust her, because she always trusted new people until they
gave her some reason not to trust them. Thus, she had a high
level of Trusting Stance, which encouraged her to be willing
to depend on her new boss.
Trusting Stance and Faith in Humanity are alike in that
they each constitute a tendency or propensity (Mayer et al.,
1995) to trust other people. They differ in terms of the
assumptions on which they build. Because Faith in Humanity
relates to assumptions about peoples’ attributes, it is more
likely to be an antecedent to Trusting Beliefs (in people) than
is Trusting Stance. Trusting Stance may relate more to
Trusting Intention, which, depending on the situation, is
probably not based wholly on beliefs about the other person,
(McKnight, et al., 1998).
Institution-based Trust means one believes the needed
conditions are in place to enable one to anticipate a
successful outcome in an endeavor or aspect of one’s life
(Luhmann, 1979; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a; Shapiro, 1987;
Zucker, 1986). This construct comes from the sociology
tradition that people can rely on others because of structures,
situations, or roles (Baier, 1986) that provide assurances that
things will go well. Zucker (1986) traces the history of
regulations and institutions in America that enabled people to
trust each other—not because they knew each other
personally, but because licensing or auditing or laws or
governmental enforcement bodies were in place to make sure
the other person was either afraid to harm you or punished if
they did harm you.
Institution-based Trust has two subconstructs, Structural
Assurance and Situational Normality. Structural Assurance
means one believes that success is likely because guarantees,
contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, processes,
or procedures are in place that assure success (Shapiro,
1987; Zucker, 1986). For example, one using the internet
would have structural assurance to the extent to which one
believed legal and technological safeguards (e.g., encryption)
protect one from privacy loss or credit card fraud. With a high
structural assurance level, one would be more likely to be
willing to rely on specific internet vendors because of the
secure feeling structural assurance engenders. In system
development, Structural Assurance might refer to the
processes and procedures that make things safe or fair in that
specific organizational setting.
Situational Normality means one believes that success is
likely because the situation is normal or favorable.
Situational normality reflects Garfinkel’s (1963) idea that
trust is the perception that things in the situation are normal,
proper, customary (Baier, 1986), fitting, or in proper order
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985a). Garfinkel found in natural
experiments that people don’t trust others when things “go
weird,” that is, when they face inexplicable, abnormal

subtypes of a data modeling supertype (Brown, 1993), each
subconstruct partakes of the overall conceptual meaning of
the supertype, but has certain attributes that distinguish it
from the supertype and from other subtypes. Another example
of this kind of typology is found in the categorization of the
animal kingdom by biologists. A cow and an elephant are
both mammals, for example, because they both give live
birth, have hair, and nourish their babies through mammary
glands (Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary). What
distinguishes the elephant from the cow are attributes like:
huge size, big ears, a flexible, elongated snout, tusks, and a
unique toe/foot arrangement. Similarly, each of the
subconstructs of our four main constructs partakes of the
nature of the construct but has parts that differentiate it from
its parent construct and from other subconstructs of its parent.
We now define Figure 1’s constructs and subconstructs.

Conceptual Definitions of Trust Constructs
Disposition to Trust. This construct means the extent to
which one displays a consistent tendency to be willing to
depend on general others across a broad spectrum of
situations and persons. This construct hails primarily from
dispositional psychology. Our definition does not literally
refer to a person’s trait. Rather, it means that one has a
general propensity to be willing to depend on others.
Disposition to trust does not necessarily imply that one
believes others to be trustworthy. Whatever the reason, one
tends to be willing to depend on others. People may grow up
with Disposition to Trust (Erikson, 1968) or may develop it
later in life. Either way, it is acted out as a generalized
reaction to life’s experiences with other people (Rotter,
1971). Because Disposition to Trust is a generalized tendency
across situations and persons, it probably colors our
interpretation of situations and actors in situations, but only
has a major effect on one’s trust-related behavior when novel
situations arise, in which the person and situation are
unfamiliar (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982).
Disposition to Trust has two subconstructs, Faith in
Humanity and Trusting Stance. Faith in Humanity refers to
underlying assumptions about people, while Trusting Stance
is like a personal strategy. Faith in Humanity means one
assumes others are usually upright, well-meaning, and
dependable (e.g., Rosenberg, 1957; Wrightsman, 1991).
Mayer et al. (1995) gave the example that if you were going
to drown, could you trust nonspecific others to come to your
aid? You would if, having high Faith in Humanity, you
assumed others generally care enough to help.
Trusting Stance means that, regardless of what one
assumes about other people generally, one assumes that one
will achieve better outcomes by dealing with people as
though they are well-meaning and reliable. Therefore, it is
like a personal choice or strategy to trust others. Because it
involves choice that is presumably based on subjective
calculation of the odds of success in a venture, Trusting
Stance derives from the calculative, economics-based trust
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situation with a feeling of relative security, even though
negative consequences are possible.
Trusting intention subconstructs include Willingness to
Depend and Subjective Probability of Depending.
Willingness to Depend means one is volitionally prepared to
make oneself vulnerable to the other person in a situation by
relying on them (e.g., Dobing, 1993; Mayer et al., 1995).
Subjective Probability of Depending means the extent to
which one forecasts or predicts that one will depend on the
other person (Currall & Judge, 1995).
Trusting Intention definitions embody five elements
synthesized from the trust literature. 1. The possibility of
negative consequences (Gambetta, 1988; Zand, 1972) or risk
(Giffin, 1967; Riker, 1971; Shapiro, 1987) is what makes
trust important but problematic. 2. A readiness to depend or
rely on another is central to trusting intention (Dobing, 1993;
Giffin, 1967; Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; Ring & Van de Ven,
1994). 3. A feeling of security means one feels safe, assured,
and comfortable (not anxious or fearful) about the prospect of
depending on another (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; Rempel et
al., 1985). Feelings of security reflect the affective side of
trusting intention. 4. Trusting intention is situation-specific
(Gabarro, 1978; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 5. Trusting intention
involves willingness that is not based on having control or
power over the other party (Riker, 1971; Gambetta, 1988;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Note that Trusting Intention
relates well to the system development power literature
because we define it in terms of dependence and control.
Additional theoretical justification for model linkages
among trust constructs is found in McKnight, et al. (1998).
Empirical evidence for these linkages is discussed in other
papers under review (e.g., Galvin, McKnight & Ahuja, 2000;
McKnight & Chervany, 2000; McKnight, Sitkin & Chervany,
2000).

situations. For example, one subject told the experimenter
he had a flat tire on the way to work. The experimenter
responded, “What do you mean, you had a flat tire?” The
subject replied, in a hostile way, “What do you mean? What
do you mean? A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant.
Nothing special. What a crazy question!” (1963: 221) At
this point, trust between them broke down because the
illogical question produced an abnormal situation.
Situational normality means that a properly ordered setting
is likely to facilitate a successful venture. When one
believes one’s role and others’ roles in the situation are
appropriate and conducive to success, then one has a basis
for trusting the people in the situation. Hence, situational
normality is likely related to Trusting Beliefs and Trusting
Intention. A system developer who feels good about the
roles and setting in which they work is likely to have
Trusting Beliefs about the people in that setting.
Our definitions represent the impersonal focus of
institution-based trust as a belief held by an individual about
impersonal things (underlying structures and situations).
While some sociologists may cringe at such an individual
cognitive focus, similar actions have been taken by
sociologists (e.g., Barber, 1983) in order to clarify the
conceptual meaning of a construct for use in explaining a
social phenomenon. Situating institution-based trust as a
mental concept also makes it consistent with the mental
constructs Trusting Beliefs and Trusting Intention.
Trusting Beliefs means one believes (and feels confident
in believing) that the other person has one or more traits
desirable to one in a situation in which negative
consequences are possible. Inference or attribution to the
other party’s traits is often included in trust definitions
(Rempel, et al., 1985; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).
Confidence in one’s belief reflects the affective side of
trusting beliefs. Confidence is often included in research and
dictionary trust definitions (e.g., Cook & Wall, 1980; Giffin,
1967; Gove, 1981; Lindskold, 1978; Scanzoni, 1979). We
include negative consequences in order to reflect the risk
inherent in trust situations.
We distinguish four main trusting belief subconstructs,
while recognizing that others exist. Trusting BeliefCompetence means one believes the other person has the
ability or power to do for one what one needs done. Trusting
Belief-Benevolence means one believes the other person
cares about one and is motivated to act in one’s interest. A
benevolent person does not act opportunistically. Trusting
Belief-Integrity means one believes the other person makes
good faith agreements, tells the truth, and fulfills promises
(Bromiley & Cummings, 1995). Trusting BeliefPredictability means one believes the other person’s actions
(good or bad) are consistent enough that one can forecast
them in a given situation.
Trusting Intention means one is willing to depend on, or
intends to depend on, the other person in a given task or

Reasons the Model May Be Helpful
1.

All the subconstructs are measurable, facilitating new
research.
2. The constructs relate to each other in new ways that
open additional research possibilities.
3. The constructs are well-defined and parsimonious
enough to be easily understood and distinguished.
4. Based on an extensive literature review, these
constructs cover the most oft-used types of trust.
5. The constructs cover the key referents of trust in the
literature.
6. The constructs represent conceptualizations from
several disciplines. Though they do not correspond
exactly to each discipline’s trust concepts, they do
capture significant conceptual meaning from each.
This typology compares favorably with other typologies in
terms of coverage. Gabarro (1978), Rempel, Holmes and
Zanna (1985) and Mishra (1996) only addressed trusting
beliefs. Bromiley and Cummings (1995) had three types of
beliefs and intention. McAllister (1995) addressed cognitive
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existing trust meanings, thereby facilitating meta-analyses of
trust research. Our typology of trust constructs helps address
conceptual confusion by representing trust as a coherent set of
four constructs and ten subconstructs. One benefit of this
depiction of trust is that it has heuristic value (Kaplan, 1964)
by generating research possibilities. We believe the model
will help researchers examine IS/customer relationships in
new ways, since the model includes personal, institutional,
and interpersonal concepts. These trust concepts may help
explain past power-related IS findings in the IS/user
relationship. Another benefit is that the model presents a
vocabulary of specifically defined trust types that scholars
and practitioners can use to converse on this important topic.
Finally, it also enables the use of more specific, and thus more
helpful, trust prescriptions.

and affective trust, which would fall into our Trusting Beliefs
category, because analysis of their items shows that they
primarily cover benevolence (affective) and competence
(cognitive) beliefs. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) have
several constructs, but their model only has three of the four
trusting beliefs and no institution-based trust constructs.

Extensions of the Model Constructs
While Trusting Belief and Trusting Intention are defined
here to refer to trust in another person, they could be
modified to refer to a trusted thing, as dictated by the
situation. For example, political science researchers have
long examined public trust in government as a variable of
interest. The public may (or may not) believe the government
is benevolent, honest or competent, just as one person may
think of another person having these traits. Some referents
may only have certain of the traits. For example, one may
believe the economy to be predictable; but it is hard to picture
the economy as having integrity and competence.
Nonetheless, our constructs have some applicability to “thingtrusting.” This means that these constructs may comfortably
migrate from one domain of study to another.
Although these definitions are geared to the personal level
of analysis, they are scalable to higher levels of analysis.
Slightly modified versions of these definitions could be used
when describing dyadic (mutual) trust between two people
(e.g., Nelson & Cooprider, 1996), trust between two groups
(Bromiley & Cummings, 1995), or trust between two
corporations. For example, one corporation could be said to
be “willing to depend” on another corporation when it
decides to enter a joint venture with it.
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